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Abstract
This paper first describes the new literature in environmental economics on the so-
called "double dividend" and then explores its implications for a broad range of economic
issues.  The basic finding in this literature is that in a second-best, general equilibrium setting,
environmental measures raise costs and prices and thereby reduce the real wage.  This rise in
the cost of living reduces slightly the quantity of labor supplied in an already highly distorted
labor market, giving rise to losses in social welfare that can be large relative to the basic
welfare gains from improved environmental policy.  These losses may be offset to some
extent by using revenues (if any) from the environmental programs to reduce existing taxes on
labor.
This same line of analysis applies to many programs and institutions in the economy
that raise the cost of living: tariffs and quotas on imports, agricultural price-support programs,
monopoly pricing, programs of occupational licensure that limit entry, and many others.  The
paper thus suggests that traditional, partial equilibrium benefit-cost analysis has, in many
instances, unwittingly omitted a potentially quite significant class of social costs from the
calculations.
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POLICY ANALYSIS IN A SECOND-BEST WORLD
Ian W. H. Parry and Wallace E. Oates*
There has appeared in the last few years a challenging new literature on the design of
policy instruments in a second-best setting.  Second-best considerations are obviously not a
new issue in economics, but this recent round of research has produced some striking and, in
certain respects, very troubling findings.  Its primary source has been a body of work in
environmental economics that has been re-examining the traditional case for Pigouvian taxes
and various quantity instruments (like systems of tradable emission permits) for mitigating the
distortions caused by environmental externalities.1  The analysis focuses on pre-existing tax
distortions in the economic system--particularly those in the labor market--and finds that the
traditional measures can increase the costs stemming from these distortions.  And this
increase in costs can be large relative to the welfare gains from the environmental
improvement.  Indeed, it has been shown that for plausible values of the key parameters, a
"perfectly" designed system of tradable emission rights--one that precisely internalizes the
environmental externality in Pigouvian fashion--may actually result in an overall loss in social
welfare (Parry et al., 1998)!  How can this be?
Our purpose in this paper is to try to explain to the profession at large just what is
going on here--and to explore its broader implications.  Upon further reflection, it appears that
the literature in environmental economics is really just the tip of the iceberg.  As we shall see,
the basic problem here is one that infects any policy measure or institutional structure with an
impact on the price of consumer goods, including such things as tariffs and quotas in
international trade, agricultural price-support and quota programs, airline safety regulations,
occupational licensure measures, minimum-wage laws, monopoly pricing, and a host of other
major features of the economic landscape.  This body of findings presents us with some
fundamental challenges to the design of a broad range of policy measures.  In particular, it
suggests that the scope of benefit-cost analysis should be expanded in some very basic ways.
We suspect that we are just beginning to understand the full range of these implications: it is
something that the profession needs to think hard about.
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To introduce the issue, it is useful to review briefly the way in which it has surfaced in
the literature in environmental economics.  We then turn to a closer treatment of the central
matter and its broader implications for policy design.
1.   THE DOUBLE-DIVIDEND DEBATE
The traditional treatment of externalities leads directly to the prescription for a
Pigouvian tax (or, alternatively, for a system of tradable permits) to correct the allocative
distortion.  The familiar unit tax equal to marginal social damages serves to internalize the
externality and redeploy economic activity in an efficient manner.  In this literature, the issue
of the revenues that such a tax generates was largely ignored.  It was typically assumed that
such revenues would be returned in some lump-sum fashion to the economic actors (e.g.,
Baumol and Oates, 1988, chap. 4).
But it then occurred to several observers that we should be able to do better than this
(e.g., Pearce, 1991; Repetto et al., 1992; and Oates, 1993).  Since the existing tax system is
itself the source of some serious distortions in the economy, why not use the revenues from
the environmental taxes (or auctioned permits) to reduce the rates on other distorting taxes
(particularly taxes on labor and capital)?  It seemed that this offered a way to kill two birds
with one stone: we could, at the same time, protect the environment and reduce the economic
costs of the tax system.  Some referred to this as a potential "double dividend" from green
taxes.
But more careful analysis has revealed that this treatment was too simplistic.  Once we
acknowledge the pre-existing distortions associated with the tax system, we must take fully
into account the basic linkages between the new environmental measures and existing taxes.
The insight provided in the new literature is that this interaction of environmental policies
with the existing system of taxes is typically the source of additional excess burden, largely
from the market for labor.  The labor market is a significantly distorted market in the sense
that there typically exists a large wedge between the gross wage paid by firms and the net
wage received by workers.  This implies that the value of the extra output produced by the last
unit of labor is substantially higher than its social cost (i.e., the value of time foregone in non-
market activities such as child rearing, leisure pursuits, etc.).  A new environmental tax results
in an increase in the costs of production.  To the extent that this is passed on in higher prices
of goods that consumers purchase, it will reduce the real wage received by households.  In
consequence, the return to work effort as compared with non-market activities falls, and there
is typically a slight reduction in labor supply.  To the extent that higher production costs
reduce the net income received by producers, they will tend to reduce output and their
demand for labor.  We thus find that the environmental tax, by inducing a fall in the overall
level of employment, generates a welfare loss in the labor market.
But surely a green tax on a polluting activity, operating only indirectly through a
minor--indeed a tiny--impact on the real wage, cannot have a sufficiently large effect on
labor-market decisions to offset much of the basic and direct welfare gains from internalizing
the environmental externality.  Wrong!  Although the effect on labor supply may be a quiteParry and Oates  RFF 98-48
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small one, it does not take much of a response in such an enormously important market--and
one that is significantly distorted at the margin--to generate significant welfare effects.
Existing estimates suggest that the combined impact of income, payroll, and sales taxes
effectively reduces the net wage at the margin to some 40 percent or so below the gross wage
(Browning, 1987).  Moreover, labor income accounts for some three-quarters of national
income.  So even a tiny movement from A to B along the horizontal axis in Figure 1 in the
labor market generates a welfare-loss rectangle whose area can be quite sizeable.  Making use
of both simple analytical models and larger, more complex computable general-equilibrium
(CGE) models, the new second-best literature makes it clear that this effect operating through
labor market decisions cannot be dismissed as "second order" in magnitude.
2.   A CLOSER LOOK
The approach used in the analytical models in this literature is fairly straightforward
[see, for example, Bovenberg and de Mooij (1994) or Parry (1995)].  Households have utility
functions that contain as arguments consumption goods, leisure, and environmental quality,
and they supply labor.  Firms produce goods and, in the process, generate pollution that
reduces environmental quality.  In the simple models, the government employs two taxes: a
tax on labor and a tax on pollution.  The models are then used to study cases of "revenue-
neutral" environmental taxes, where the revenues raised from unit taxes on pollution are used
to reduce the tax on labor.
It is instructive to characterize the findings from this kind of analysis in terms of three
distinct effects on economic welfare: the "primary welfare gain," a "revenue-recycling effect,"
and a "tax-interaction effect."  The first is simply the familiar welfare gain whose source is the
benefits net of the (partial-equilibrium) costs from the environmental improvement.  In terms
of Figure 2, this gain is just the well-known triangle (OAB) that results from internalizing the
external effect (or social cost) from waste emissions, in this case with a unit tax on emissions
of Ot.  In a first-best analysis, with environmental tax revenues returned in lump-sum fashion,
this is all there is to the matter.
In the presence of pre-existing tax distortions, however, there is more to worry about.
Now the revenues that are raised by the environmental tax (EBCF in Figure 2) can be used to
reduce the rates on existing distorting taxes.  In the simple analytical models, this means that
they replace revenues from the tax on labor.  Hence, there is a second source of welfare gain:
the revenue-recycling effect.  This gain comes from the small reduction in the wedge between
the gross and net wage with a resulting increase in the level of employment.
But, as mentioned earlier, there is a third effect that involves the way in which the
environmental tax interacts with the existing tax on labor.  In the analytical models (which
typically assume the demand for labor to be perfectly elastic) the environmental tax
discourages work effort by reducing the real household wage.  This is the tax-interaction
effect--and it reduces welfare.4
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The effect of the environmental tax on economic welfare thus depends on the net
impact of these three effects.  The findings from the analytical models (and many of the CGE
exercises as well) indicate that, in general, the cost of the tax-interaction effect dominates the
benefits from the revenue-recycling effect.  That is, the welfare loss from the reduction in
work effort from a reduced real wage is larger than the welfare gain from a reduced tax rate
on labor.  The implication is that the overall welfare (or efficiency) gain from taxing waste
emissions is something less than the primary welfare gain associated with a first-best
analysis.2  Of course, environmental taxes can produce important benefits in terms of
improved environmental quality and incentives for the development of cleaner production
methods.  However, these benefits generally do not include a reduction in the overall
economic costs of the tax system--the double-dividend hypothesis is typically invalid.
This result should not be so surprising from the perspective of the earlier literature in
public finance on optimal (or Ramsey) taxation.3  This literature has established the principle
that broad-based taxes are to be generally preferred on efficiency grounds to more narrow
ones.  Excess burden results from individuals and firms shifting away from taxed activities.
There is typically much greater scope for such substitution when the tax base is a narrow one
(for example, a polluting input in a specific industry) than when it encompasses a broad range
of activity (such as a tax on all labor income or a general consumption tax).  When we replace
revenues from labor taxes with revenues from more narrowly focused taxes, we open up a
wider range of substitution possibilities for consumers and firms, and this typically raises the
excess burden of the tax system.
The recent literature suggests that in a second-best setting, the optimal tax on waste
emissions is somewhat less than the marginal social damages to the environment.  Just how
much less depends on the level of environmental damages, the way in which the revenues are
recycled, and various parameters (notably the elasticity of labor supply).  In Table 1, we
report some findings from a study by Lans Bovenberg and Lawrence Goulder (two of the
major contributors to this literature).  Using both an analytical model and a numerical CGE
model, they have estimated the Pigouvian tax and optimal second-best taxes on carbon
emissions for a variety of cases.  We see in column 2 that the Pigouvian tax is (reassuringly)
simply equal to the marginal environmental (social) damages in column 1.  In column 3, we
find that the optimal tax (as calculated from the analytical model) is somewhat less--on the
order of 80 to 90 percent--of the Pigouvian levy, assuming that the revenues are recycled in
the form of a reduction in the personal income tax (PIT).  The results from the numerical
model suggest a somewhat larger divergence of the optimal, from the Pigouvian, tax; here the
extent of the difference depends on whether the recycling takes an "optimized" or more
                                               
2 There are some important qualifications to this result.  For example, it can be reversed if output from the
polluting industry is a sufficiently weaker substitute for leisure than other goods.  In addition, the models in this
literature typically assume that environmental effects are separable in the utility function from leisure.  In
consequence, they effectively abstract from any feedback effects from improved environmental quality on
labor/leisure decisions (e.g., health effects).
3 See Sandmo (1976) for a survey.Parry and Oates  RFF 98-48
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realistic form of replacement of personal income taxes.  In the latter case, we see in column 5
that the optimal tax may fall far below the Pigouvian rate--in one case by over 50 percent.
But most striking is column 4, where the revenues are recycled in the form of the lump-sum
rebate that appears in the academic literature.  For this case, the optimal tax is zero for
marginal environmental damages of $50 per ton or less.  A positive tax for this range of cases
would actually reduce welfare; this occurs because there is effectively no revenue-recycling
effect (i.e., reduction in the tax on labor) to offset any of the tax-interaction effect.
Table 1.  Differences between Pigouvian and Second-Best Taxes
(All rates in dollars per ton)























25 25 22 0 7 17
50 50 45 0 27 41
75 75 67 13 48 64
100 100 89 31 68 85
Source: Bovenberg and Goulder (1996).
This last result is of much more than purely academic interest.  For it immediately
calls to mind the use of quantity instruments where the emissions permits are simply given
away to sources.  Under the Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990, for example, we are cutting
aggregate national sulfur emissions in the U.S. by 50 percent under a program where we
simply distributed the initial emissions allowances free of charge to sources.  A similar
emissions permit program is being proposed as a means to meeting the U.S. pledge to limit
future carbon emissions.  The problem with these programs is that there is no revenue-
recycling effect.4  As recently shown by Parry et al. (1998) and Parry (1997), even for "ideal"
systems that set the quantity of permits by a Pigouvian rule, it is possible that for reasonable
values of the key parameters, the tax-interaction effect will be larger than the primary welfare
gain from the program.  Thus, the loss in welfare from reduced work effort can more than
                                               
4 This is not quite accurate.  Emissions permits create rents for firms.  These are reflected in higher profits
(subject to corporate income taxation) and in additional taxes when distributed to households in the form of
dividends or capital gains.  As a result, about a third of these rents may accrue to the government in the form of
tax revenues.  Grandfathered emissions permits can produce a complete revenue-recycling effect equivalent to
that under an emissions tax only in the limiting case where rents are 100 percent taxed.Parry and Oates  RFF 98-48
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offset the gains from reduced pollution!  Such a system of tradable allowances--a system
strongly supported by environmental economists as a major step forward in the use of market
incentives for environmental protection--could possibly reduce social welfare.
One lesson that emerges from the new literature is the potential importance of
revenue-recycling.  From the second-best perspective, a system of tradable allowances set in
motion by an auction of the permits to sources can be much preferred to one in which the
permits are distributed to the sources without charge.  The former generates revenues that can
be used to reduce other distorting taxes, while the latter does not.  This admittedly raises some
tricky matters of political economy.  One of the attractions of these quantity instruments in the
policy arena has been the receptivity to them of polluting firms, who would much prefer to
receive an allotment of tradable permits than to be subject to a tax on their emissions or,
alternatively, to be forced to compete in an auction for the permits.  But, in a second-best
setting, such provisions for the free distribution of permits may compromise the welfare-
improving potential of the system.  Moreover, even if the program generates revenues through
an auction of permits or some schedule of charges, there is no guarantee that the newly
generated revenues will be employed to reduce rates on other distorting taxes.5
A further important point from the recent literature is that the relative importance of
the tax-interaction effect is sensitive to the level of environmental regulation.  When marginal
environmental benefits (MEB) in Figure 2 are more modest relative to marginal control costs
(MC) (as is thought to be the case for carbon emissions), then the Pigouvian level of
emissions reductions will tend to be relatively small, and it becomes more likely that the
welfare loss rectangle in Figure 1 outweighs the Pigouvian welfare gain triangle in Figure 2
[Parry et al. (1998)].  In contrast, where marginal environmental benefits are relatively large
(as estimates suggest for the case of sulfur emissions), the tax-interaction effect is unlikely to
reverse the sign of the welfare impact from positive to negative [see Goulder et al. (1997)].
3.   SOME BROADER IMPLICATIONS
Although most of the new literature focuses on programs for environmental
management, upon reflection it becomes clear that this is a very general issue.  For any
program or institution that influences the costs of production or in any other way affects the
labor market is going to generate some social gains or losses of the kind that we have
examined here.  In fact, an independent discovery of the importance of this phenomenon arose
in a very different kind of study.  Edgar Browning (1997), re-examining the welfare losses
associated with monopoly pricing, found (somewhat to his astonishment) that the welfare
costs of monopoly distortions in a second-best framework were many times larger than those
implied by the familiar Harberger triangles.
                                               
5 In fact, environmental programs that generate revenues often contain provisions that direct the revenues into
some kind of trust fund that must be used for environmental enhancement.  Of course such spending may
produce a significant efficiency gain--but only if the social benefits per dollar of additional spending are well in
excess of a dollar.Parry and Oates  RFF 98-48
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Some further thought suggests that programs like tariffs and quotas on imports or
agricultural price-supports and quotas, which drive up prices and effectively reduce the real
wage, are likely to have substantial welfare costs stemming from labor-market distortions in
addition to the more traditional forms of welfare losses that economists have measured.
Indeed, we suspect that as this second-best analytical framework is applied to a wide range of
programs, we will find that the welfare losses associated with many of these programs are
significantly larger than we previously thought.
To take one such case, Williams (1998) and Parry (1998) have recently shown that the
presence of pre-existing taxes can raise the economic costs of tariffs and import quotas by a
potentially substantial amount.  Again, this arises because these policies raise the prices of
consumer goods, thereby reducing the real wage and hence employment.  In fact, interactions
with the tax system can eliminate the well-known textbook case for an optimal tariff when a
country has market power in trade, unless the tariff revenues are used to finance reductions in
other distortionary taxes.
It is easy to extend the list of potential applications.  It would appear, for example, that
the costs of airline safety regulations, programs of occupational licensure that limit entry and
increase prices, and minimum-wage laws can be much magnified in their impacts when pre-
existing taxes are taken into account.  It is not the case, incidentally, that such a second-best
framework implies that public programs are inevitably more costly than a partial-equilibrium
treatment would indicate.  There may well be some important cases where there are some
complementarities to work effort.  One that comes to mind is traffic congestion.  A (revenue-
neutral) toll on a congested roadway for commuters that reduces travel time may, under
certain circumstances, effectively raise the real wage and induce an increase in employment.6
CONCLUDING REMARKS
This new literature thus raises a large red flag to those engaged in benefit-cost
analysis: beware of partial-equilibrium studies.  In a distorted economy, notably one with a
wide spread between the gross and net wage, it is important to take into account the indirect
welfare effects of public programs on the labor market (and perhaps other factor markets).7
                                               
6 The analysis also has some important implications for subsidy programs, such as those for child care.  Here the
tax-interaction effect results in a welfare gain where such subsidies reduce the price of goods and services.  This
implies that the tax-interaction effect may offset much of the cost of financing a subsidy by distortionary taxes.
7 Some of the numerical models are dynamic with capital accumulation and allow for tax distortions in the
capital market [e.g., Bovenberg and Goulder (1997) and Jorgenson and Wilcoxen (1993)].  Tax interactions are
more complex in this setting.  To the extent that environmental regulations discourage investment by raising the
cost of producing output in future periods, they tend to compound the welfare costs of taxes on capital.
Bovenberg and Goulder (1997) show that incorporating capital can either strengthen or weaken the results from
static one-factor models, depending on whether the revenue-neutral environmental tax reform expands or
reduces inefficiencies associated with the uneven taxation of labor and capital.  However, given that the capital
market is only around one-third the size of the labor market, we would expect the results from the static models
to be reasonably robust to incorporating capital.Parry and Oates  RFF 98-48
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In certain cases, these indirect effects (although seemingly small) can outweigh the primary
welfare effects of the program.
This is a troubling and sobering finding, because it complicates the task of policy
analysis and can undermine the case for certain programs that have long been dear to
economists working in a first-best setting.  At the same time, the results from the recent
literature are preliminary in a number of respects.  We surely have much more to learn about
the properties and applicability of this analysis to the evaluation of public policy.
One issue, in particular, stands out: the structure and workings of the labor market.
For, as we have seen, it is the indirect impact of these programs on levels of employment that
is the source of most of the "secondary," but large, welfare effects in a general-equilibrium
setting.  The labor market, as we are all well aware, is a very complex institution with many
facets.  The analyses we have described here simply treat it as a single, integrated and
competitive market.  But, in truth, it is difficult to estimate the overall employment effects
caused by policies that affect the real wage, because these effects depend on a diverse set of
decisions involving labor-market participation and hours worked for a variety of different
groups in varying settings.  There exists in the labor literature a substantial range of estimates
of the relevant labor supply elasticities so that any projections of the effects of changes in the
real wage on employment are subject to a fair amount of uncertainty.  Our point here is
simply that given the importance of the labor-market responses to the bottom line in benefit-
cost studies of public programs, it is crucial that we have a sound understanding and reliable
estimates of labor-market behavior.
This is likely to be even more complicated and important outside the United States.  It
may be reasonable to characterize the U.S. labor market as a competitive market, but this
seems less true in, say, Europe, where there are many more regulations (including more
generous unemployment benefits, provisions for retirement, higher minimum wages, higher
taxes on labor, etc.) and much stronger labor unions that impinge on (and distort) the
workings of the market.  The high levels of unemployment that are plaguing many of the
European nations appear, at least in part, to stem from these provisions.  Perhaps the revenue-
recycling effects that result in lower taxes on labor and the tax-interaction effects from a
reduced real wage operate a bit differently in the context of some of these institutional
features of European labor markets.
Finally, we want to return to environmental economics long enough to say that we do
not see these new findings as grounds for abandoning the economist's case for pricing
incentives for environmental protection.  The argument here has been limited to an essentially
static framework.  And, as economists have long argued, one of the most important properties
(in fact, perhaps the most important) of incentive-based instruments for environmental
management is the inducement that such instruments provide for the development and
adoption of new techniques for pollution control.  The welfare gains from such technical
advances may well dominate the static gains from the more efficient deployment of resources
within a given technological context.Parry and Oates  RFF 98-48
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Our central, and more general, point is that there exists a potentially major element of
social costs that has been systematically overlooked in the analysis of a wide class of public
programs and economic institutions.  It is tempting simply to dismiss such findings on the
grounds that "We know that anything can happen in a second-best setting."  But this really
misses the point.  The contribution of this new literature is to show specifically what can
happen under certain, well-defined and realistic circumstances; it reduces the ambiguity.  And
the results seem quite robust: there is now a large body of work, encompassing both analytical
and numerical studies, that has firmly established the potential importance of these indirect
effects operating through factor markets.  Moreover, as we have seen, this work generates
some valuable insights into the design of policy measures (most notably the importance of
revenue recycling).  The new second-best literature, as we read it, presents a serious challenge
to much of the traditional policy analysis.  There is much to digest and to try to understand
here.Parry and Oates  RFF 98-48
12
REFERENCES
Baumol, William J. and Wallace E. Oates.  1998.  The Theory of Environmental Policy,
Second Edition (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press).
Bovenberg, A. Lans, and Ruud A. de Mooij.  1994.  "Environmental Levies and Distortionary
Taxation," American Economic Review, vol. 84, pp. 1085-1089.
Bovenberg, A. Lans, and Lawrence H. Goulder.  1996.  "Optimal Environmental Taxation in
the Presence of Other Taxes: General Equilibrium Analyses," American Economic
Review, vol. 86, pp. 985-1000.
Bovenberg, A. Lans, and Lawrence H. Goulder.  1997.  "Costs of Environmentally Motivated
Taxes in the Presence of Other Taxes: General Equilibrium Analyses," National Tax
Journal, vol. 50, pp. 59-88.
Bovenberg, A. Lans, and Lawrence H. Goulder.  1998.  "Environmental Taxation," in A.
Auerbach and M. Feldstein, eds., Handbook of Public Economics, Second Edition (New
York: North-Holland), forthcoming.
Bovenberg, A. Lans, and Frederick van der Ploeg.  1994.  "Environmental Policy, Public
Finance and the Labor Market in a Second Best World," Journal of Public Economics,
vol. 55, pp.  349-390.
Browning, Edgar K.  1987.  "On the Marginal Welfare Cost of Taxation," American
Economic Review, vol. 77, pp. 11-23.
Browning, Edgar K.  1997.  "A Neglected Welfare Cost of Monopoly--and Most Other
Product Market Distortions," Journal of Public Economics, vol. 66, pp. 127-144.
Fullerton, Don, and Gilbert Metcalf.  1997.  Environmental Controls, Scarcity Rents, and Pre-
Existing Distortions, NBER Working Paper No. 6091, Cambridge, Mass. (July).
Goulder, Lawrence H., Ian W. H. Parry, and Dallas Burtraw.  1997.  "Revenue-Raising Vs.
Other Approaches to Environmental Protection: The Critical Significance of Pre-Existing
Tax Distortions," RAND Journal of Economics, vol. 28, no. 4 (Winter), pp. 708-731.
Goulder, Lawrence H., Ian W. H. Parry, Roberton C. Williams, and Dallas Burtraw.  1998.
"The Cost-Effectiveness of Alternative Instruments for Environmental Protection in a
Second-Best Setting," Journal of Public Economics, forthcoming.
Jorgenson, Dale W., and Peter J. Wilcoxen.  1993.  "Reducing U.S. Carbon Emissions: An
Econometric General Equilibrium Assessment," Resource and Energy Economics,
vol. 15:, pp. 7-26.
Oates, Wallace E.  1993.  "Pollution Charges as a Source of Public Revenues," in H. Giersch, ed.,
Economic Progress and Environmental Concerns (Berlin: Springer-Verlag), pp. 135-152.
Oates, Wallace E.  1995.  "Green Taxes: Can We Protect the Environment and Improve the
Tax System at the Same Time?" Southern Economic Journal, vol. 61, pp. 915-922.Parry and Oates  RFF 98-48
13
Parry, Ian W. H.  1995.  "Pollution Taxes and Revenue Recycling," Journal of Environmental
Economics and Management, vol. 29, pp. S64-S77.
Parry, Ian W. H.  1997.  "Environmental Taxes and Quotas in the Presence of Distorting
Taxes in Factor Markets," Resource and Energy Economics, 19, pp. 203-220.
Parry, Ian W. H.  1998.  The Costs of Restrictive Trade Policies in the Presence of Factor Tax
Distortions, Discussion Paper No. 98-37, Resources for the Future, Washington, D.C.,
June.
Parry, Ian W. H., Roberton C. Williams, and Lawrence H. Goulder.  1998.  "When Can
Carbon Abatement Policies Increase Welfare? The Fundamental Role of Distorted Factor
Markets," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, forthcoming.
Pearce, David W.  1991.  "The Role of Carbon Taxes in Adjusting to Global Warming,"
Economic Journal, vol. 101, pp. 938-948.
Repetto, Robert, Roger C. Dower, Robin Jenkins, and Jacqueline Geoghegan.  1992.  Green
Fees: How a Tax Shift Can Work for the Environment and the Economy (Washington,
D.C.: World Resources Institute).
Sandmo, Agnar.  1976.  "Optimal Taxation: An Introduction to the Literature," Journal of
Public Economics, vol. 6, pp. 37-54.
Williams, Roberton C.  1998.  "Revisiting the Cost of Protectionism: The Role of Tax
Distortions in the Labor Market," Journal of International Economics, forthcoming.